Stackelberg Disequilibrium and Dynamics of Collective Behavior
Abstract
In this paper, an oligopolistic market of Stackelberg firms only is considered. The problem of achieving the Stackelberg disequilibrium using reflexive games and models of collective behavior dynamics is investigated in the class of demand and cost linear functions for oligopolistic firms. The problem peculiarity is the behavior of oligopolists that comes from incorrect (iteratively adjustable) ideas of marginal costs of other oligopolists while evaluating the scope of delivery. The model of indicator (collective) behavior is the basis of dynamic procedure of clarifying the ideas of marginal costs. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence regardless of initial ideas, the dynamic procedure with constant and equal steps to the Stackelberg disequilibrium with true values of marginal costs of oligopolists for all firms are obtained. The presented results demonstrate the possibility of correct evaluation of certain characteristics of competitors for markets based on incorrect ideas of oligopolists on a behavior of competitors.Downloads
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